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PROSECUTING U.N. PEACEKEEPERS
FOR SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED
VIOLENCE IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN
REPUBLIC
INTRODUCTION
omen and children living in armed conflict are amongst
the most vulnerable populations at-risk of sexual and
gender-based violence.1 When U.N. peacekeepers arrive to help
dispel conflict, these populations believe that the soldiers in blue
helmets will protect them from violence and exploitation. In-
stead, hundreds of women and children in the Central African
Republic (CAR) have reported being raped and sexually violated
by U.N. peacekeepers.2 Despite compelling evidence to validate
1. Rosanne Marrit Anholt, Understanding Sexual Violence in Armed Con-
flict: Cutting Ourselves With Occam’s Razor, 1 J. INT’LHUMANITARIAN ACTION,
no. 6, June 2016, at 1, 2; UN WOMEN, A FRAMEWORK TO UNDERPIN ACTION TO
PREVENT VIOLENCE AGAINSTWOMEN 13,
http://www2.unwomen.org/~/media/headquarters/attachments/sections/li-
brary/publications/2015/prevention_framework_un-
women_nov2015.pdf?v=1&d=20151124T225223.
2. Joshua Berlinger, Holly Yan&Richard Roth,U.N. Peacekeepers Accused
of Raping Civilians, CNN (Apr. 6, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/04/06/af-
rica/united-nations-peacekeepers-sexual-abuse/; Catherine Wambua-Soi, UN:
Dealing with Rape in Central African Republic, AL-JAZEERA (July 11, 2016),
http://www.aljazeera.com/blogs/africa/2016/07/dealing-rape-central-african-
republic-160711164252767.html.
W
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these claims,3 U.N. peacekeepers who commit these crimes are
seldom held accountable.4
In 1948 and 1949, the first peacekeeping missions occurred un-
der the control of the U.N. Office of Special Political Affairs.5 The
first peacekeepers were deployed during the Cold War era under
the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) and U.N.
Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) to
dispel violence across the Middle East.6 In 1992, Secretary-Gen-
eral, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, created the U.N. Department of
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), which was charged with
overseeing all peacekeeping operations worldwide.7 As of July
2016, there are over 180,000 DPKO personnel, consisting of
3. See, e.g., Emily Wax, Congo’s Desperate ‘One-Dollar U.N. Girls’, WASH.
POST (Mar. 21, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/arti-
cles/A52333-2005Mar20.html (7The United Nations is investigating 150 in-
stances in which 50 peacekeeping troops or civilians in the Congo mission are
suspected of having sexually abused or exploited women and girls, some as
young as 12.5); UN Troops Face Child Abuse Claims, BBC NEWS (Nov. 30,
2006), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6195830.stm (7The UN has faced
several scandals involving its troops in recent years, including a DR Congo
pedophile ring and prostitute trafficking in Kosovo.5); Elsa Buchanan, UN
Peacekeeping: Allegations of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse—A 20 Year History
of Shame, INT’LBUS. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2016), http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/un-peace-
keeping-allegations-sexual-exploitation-abuse-20-year-history-shame-
1547581 (outlining scandals from 1996 to 2016).
4. Marie Deschamps, Hassan B. Jallow & Yasmin Sooka, Taking Action on
Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by Peacekeepers: Report of an Independent Re-
view on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by International Peacekeeping Forces
in the Central African Republic, UNITED NATIONS, v (Dec. 17, 2015),
http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/centafricrepub/Independent-Review-Re-
port.pdf (7Unfortunately, neither the SRSG of MINUSCA nor the head of HRJS
considered the U.N. to have a duty to pursue the accountability process. As a
result, they took no steps to inform the French government of the Allega-
tions.5); see also Samuel Oakford, French Peacekeepers Allegedly Tied Up Girls
and Forced Them Into Bestiality, VICE NEWS (Mar. 31, 2016),
https://news.vice.com/article/french-peacekeepers-allegedly-tied-up-girls-and-
forced-them-to-have-sex-with-dogs (7French authorities say they are investi-
gating the initial cases from late 2013 and early 2014, but have provided few
details and have not announced any charges against soldiers.5).
5. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, U.N. PEACEKEEPING,
https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/department-of-peacekeeping-operations (last
visited Dec. 29, 2017).
6. Id.
7. Id.
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roughly 80,000 peacekeepers, working at sixteen U.N. peace-
keeping missions around the world.8
Despite its name, U.N. peacekeepers have failed to achieve
peace.9 In some instances, these peacekeepers have brought fur-
ther terror upon local populations by sexually abusing and ex-
ploiting women and children, thereby compounding their
trauma.10 From sexual assault and exploitation to survival sex
and rape, U.N. peacekeepers have consistently been caught in
scandal after scandal,11 continuing to act with impunity.12
In recent years, the United Nations has increased efforts to
eradicate the incidence of abuse perpetrated by its peacekeepers
against local populations.13 The United Nations, however, is con-
strained by Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) and Memo-
randa of Understanding (MOUs), which give troop contributing
countries—the providers of U.N. peacekeepers—exclusive juris-
diction over its own military personnel and sole responsibility
Mo' 'eO'essinL tJei' t'oo*s’ misQonO&Qt^14 When allegations of
8. Id.
9. Wax, supra note 3; UN Troops Face Child Abuse Claims, supra note 3;
Buchanan, supra note 3.
10. Wax, supra note 3, at 1 (7The United Nations is investigating 150 in-
stances in which 50 peacekeeping troops or civilians in the Congo mission are
suspected of having sexually abused or exploited women and girls, some as
young as 12.5); UN Troops Face Child Abuse Claims, supra note 3, at 1 (7The
UN has faced several scandals involving its troops in recent years, including a
DR Congo pedophile ring and prostitute trafficking in Kosovo.5).
11. Buchanan, supra note 3, at 1 (outlining scandals from 1996 to 2016).
12. Felicity Lewis, Human Rights Abuses in U.N. Peacekeeping: Providing
Redress and Punishment While Continuing Peacekeeping Missions for Human-
itarian Progress, 23 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 595, 597 (2014). See also Mark L.
Goldberg, Haiti Peacekeeper Abuse and Why It’s So Hard to Prosecute Interna-
tional Peacekeepers, UN DISPATCH (Jan. 9, 2012), https://www.undis-
patch.com/haiti-peacekeeper-abuse-and-why-its-so-hard-to-prosecute-interna-
tional-peacekeepers/; Tom Dennenbaum, Translating the Standard of Effective
Control into a System of Effective Accountability: How Liability Should be Ap-
portioned for Violations of Human Rights by Member State Troop Contingents
Serving as United Nations Peacekeepers, 51 HARV. INT’L L. 127, 127N28 (2009).
13. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Condemns 3in the
Strongest Terms’ All Acts of Sexual Abuse, Exploitation by UN Peacekeeping
Personnel, U.N. Press Release SC/8400 (May 31, 2005).
14. See U.N. Secretary General, Comprehensive Review of the Whole Ques-
tion of Peace-Keeping Operations in All of Their Aspects, annex ¶¶ 14, 24N31,
46N49, U.N. Doc. A/45/594 (Oct. 9, 1990) [hereinafter Model SOFA] (discussing
jurisdiction); Rep. of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and
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misconduct are conveyed to the troop contributing countries, the
onus is on them to investigate the allegations and prosecute if
necessary.15 Unfortunately, prosecution seldom occurs, leaving
victims without justice.16
This Note will address how to hold U.N. peacekeepers account-
able for their human rights violations, namely the sexual exploi-
tation and abuse of women and children in CAR during its
armed conflict. This Note will argue that troop-contributing
countries should retain responsibility and jurisdiction over their
military personnel sent on U.N. peacekeeping missions. Failure
to investigate and prosecute their troops should constitute a
breach in state responsibility to exercise due diligence17 in pre-
venting human rights abuses, namely the right to be free from
sexual violence. In order to address this ill, as well as balance
national sovereignty interests and international human rights
concerns, the United Nations should continue to allow troop con-
tributing countries to retain sole prosecutorial powers, but also
implement strict guidelines in SOFAs and MOUs for States Par-
ties to follow when investigating and punishing peacekeeper
misconduct. Should States Parties fail to implement these guide-
lines, they ought to be held liable for failure to follow through on
agreed upon commitments.
This Note will introduce the conflict in CAR and the human
rights abuses that followed. It will also examine the legal infra-
structure that insulates the peacekeepers from accountability,
while proposing a new framework that ensures peacekeeper
prosecutions in troop contributing countries by way of invoking
state responsibility. Part I of this Note will explain the current
crisis in CAR, detail the international response to the crisis, and
its Working Groupon the 2007 Resumed Session, U.N. Doc. A/61/19 (Part III),
annex (June 11, 2007) [hereinafter Revised Model MOU].
15. Accountability for Conduct and Discipline in Field Missions, UNITED
NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING
OPERATIONS, AND DEPARTMENT OF FIELD SUPPORT ¶¶ 16.1N16.5 (Aug. 1, 2015),
https://unmil.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/policy_on_accountabil-
ity_for_conduct_and_discipline_in_field_missions_30-07-2015.pdf.
16. Lewis, supra note 12, at 597. See also Goldberg, supra note 12; Dennen-
baum, supra note 12, at 127N28.
17. G.A. Res. 48/104, Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against
Women, (Feb. 23, 1994), art. 4(c), [hereinafter Declaration on the Elimination
of Violence Against Women] (referring to the due diligence obligation to pre-
vent, investigate, punish, and provide compensation for acts of violence against
women, whether those acts are perpetrated by the State or by private persons).
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document the alleged sexual assaults by U.N. peacekeeping
forces. Part II will then introduce the international legal land-
scape that insulates peacekeeping forces from being held ac-
countable by the United Nations itself, despite international
laws, treaties, and cases actively fighting to prevent violence
against women and children in conflict situations. Finally, Part
III will propose a solution to this institutional failure by calling
for the enforcement of strict investigation and prosecution re-
quirements, which will hold States responsible for the human
rights abuses of their troops.
I. OVERVIEW OF CAR: HOW AHISTORY OF COLONIALISM AND
ETHNIC STRIFE CULMINATED INTO INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT
This Part will provide a brief overview of the current crisis in
CAR, including details of human rights violations by the two
warring factions, Séléka and anti-balaka. It will then explain the
inte'nationaH Qomm&nith’s 'es*onse to tJe Q'isisb inQH&OinL tJe
creation of the peacekeeping mission in CAR. Finally, this Part
will document the alleged sexual assaults by U.N. peacekeeping
forces through official reports and personal accounts.
A. Central African History and Roots of the Current Conflict
Like most of Africa, CAR has a rich and varied history.
Roughly 10,000 years ago, diverse groups began to settle in the
CAR region, transforming a nomadic lifestyle into that of fisher-
men and farmers.18 As tJe 'eLion’s *o*&Hation L'ejb anO as tJe
world continued to develop transportation technology, addi-
tional groups began to settle in the region, bringing with them
diverse cultures and languages.19 Beginning in the sixteenth
century, however, the CAR region experienced violent raids by
Muslim slave raiders, dramatically depopulating and devastat-
ing the region.20 The CAR region continued to change dramati-
18. AMYMCKENNA, THEHISTORY OF CENTRAL ANDEASTERN AFRICA 4 (2011).
19. Id. at 6.
20. Thomas E. O’Toole, Tamara Lynn Giles-Vernick & Jan S.F. van
Hoogstraten, Central African Republic, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/place/Central-African-Republic (last visited Dec.
29, 2017).
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cally during tJe 78Q'amlHe Mo' AM'iQab5 jJe'e [&'o*ean Qo&n`
tries fought over parts of the continent to colonize.21 In 1894, af-
ter a tug-of-war between Belgium, France, Great Britain, and
Germany, France took control over the CAR region, naming it
3tJe Z'enQJ ConLo^’22 Similar to the rest of the African continent
plagued by colonialism, the French wreaked havoc on the indig-
enous populations. Most notably, the French favored some
groups over others, serving as a harbinger to the ethnic strife
observed in the ensuing decades.23 After World War II and years
of violent resistance, France began to relinquish some of its pow-
e'sb &HtimateHh HeaOinL to CA9’s inOe*enOenQe in G=@\^24
After declaring independence, CAR struggled to create a stable
and effective form of government, experiencing several dramatic
regime changes25 and ongoing religious tension between the
Christian leadership and Muslim minorities.26 In the early
2000s, under the Christian President, François Bozizé,27 CAR
government forces ramped up religious aggressions and engaged
21. The Scramble for Africa, ST. JOHNS COLLEGE LIBRARY, UNIVERSITY OF
CAMBRIDGE, https://www.joh.cam.ac.uk/library/library_exhibitions/schoolre-
sources/exploration/scramble_for_africa/ (last visited Dec. 29, 2017) (7In 1884N
5 the Scramble for Africa was at full speed. Thirteen European countries and
the United States met in Berlin to agree the rules of African colonization. From
1884 to 1914 the continent was in conflict as these countries took territory and
power from existing African states and peoples.5).
22. O’Toole, supra note 20, at 9.
23. Id. at 1.
24. Id. at 9.
25. Alexis Arieff, Crisis in the Central African Republic, CONGRESSIONAL
RES. SERV. 1 (Jan. 27, 2014).
26. Spencer Zifcak, What Happened to the International Community? R2P
and the Conflicts in South Sudan and the Central African Republic, 16
MELBOURNE J. OF INT’ LAW 52, 62 (2015).
27. President Bozizé came to power through a coup against then-President
Patassé in 2003. Arieff, supra note 25, at 1. CAR had elected President Ange-
Félix Patassé in 1999, after years of military and autocratic rulers. Id. at 4.
Patassé was from northern CAR, but was Christian and at first appeared ca-
pable of stabilizing the country. Id. at 5. Patassé, however, soon led large-
scaled human rights abuses against CAR civilians, prompting Bozizé, then an
army general, to oust Patassé. Id. Similar to Patassé, Bozizé looked promising
at first by bringing relative stability to the country. Id. Bozizé, however, began
to perpetrate violence against opposition leaders and Muslim civilians,
prompting many to view him as just another autocratic, self-interested presi-
dent. Id.
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in widespread human rights abuses against the Muslim opposi-
tion.28 In March 2013, after finally reaching a tipping point, the
Séléka rebel forces29 o&steO !ogigkb QitinL tJe :'esiOent’s MaiH&'e
to follow the terms of a peace agreement reached between the
government and Séléka forces in the previous years.30 This coup
O’ktat *HaQeO tJeS&sHim o**osition in *oje' Mo' tJe Mi'st time in
CA9’s moOe'n Jisto'hb *'o%iOinL tJem jitJ tJe o**o't&nith to
seek vengeance for past grievances.31 Indeed, once in power, the
predominantly Muslim Séléka forces perpetrated attacks on
Christian communities, including, sexual assault, rape, murder,
and torture,32 further exacerbating ethno-religious tensions in
CAR.33 The attacks by the Séléka prompted the creation of an-
other rebel faction, the anti-balaka, a Christian militia that
launched attacks against Muslim communities that were so se-
vere that the United Nations declared that they amounted to
28. Zifcak, supra note 26, at 63.
29. For a further explanation of the Séléka, see Jason Warner, Who Are
Séléka, GLOBAL PUB. SQUARE (Jan. 17, 2013), at 1, explaining that:
[T]he Séléka insurgency is an alliance of an estimated 1,000
to 3,000 former rebels. . . . Officially, Séléka is the title given
to the broader alliance of smaller groups . . . that have qualms
jitJ !ogigk’s Lo%e'nment^ WnOeeOb 8kHkka is tJo&LJt to Ja%e
come into existence only [in] September [2012], making its
QoaHition oMMiQiaH ^ ^ ^ jJen tJ'ee oM tJe Qo&nt'h’s 'eleH
groups—6Je :at'iots’ Con%ention Mo' V&stiQe anO :eaQe
(CPJP), The Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR),
and The Democratic Front of Central African People
(FDPC)—allied themselves in opposition to the Bozizé re-
gime.
Id.
30. Zifcak, supra note 26, at 62.
31. Id.
32. Arieff, supra note 25, at 1; Zifcak, supra note 26, at 63.
33. Central African Republic: The Roots of Violence, INT’L CRISIS GROUP
(Sept. 21, 2015), https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/central-afri-
can-republic/central-african-republic-roots-violence.
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7etJniQ QHeansinL^534 In response, Séléka forces stepped up ag-
gressions even further,35 implicating all sides in human rights
abuses.36
B. The International Response
By September 2013, it became clear that the situation in CAR
warranted an international response.37 Not wanting to send a
U.N. peacekeeping force right away, the U.N. Security Council
adopted Resolution 2127,38 authorizing the International Sup-
port Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA), led by the
African Union (AU), and deploying French-backed peacekeep-
ers, code-nameO 7;*e'ation 8anLa'is^539 The 6,000 MISCA
peacekeepers and 1,600 Sangaris forces soon found themselves
ill-equipped to protect the nearly two million Central Africans in
need.40 As the situation in CAR continued to spiral out of control,
international organizations strongly urged the U.N. Security
Council to create a U.N. peacekeeping mission to generate sta-
bility and peace in the region.41
Despite initial opposition from Russia and the United States,
the Security Council could no longer ignore the atrocities occur-
ring in CAR.42 In April 2014, after nearly a year of violence in
CAR, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2149,43 establish-
ing the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabiliza-
tion Mission in Central African Republic (MINUSCA) and au-
thorizing the deployment of U.N. peacekeepers to CAR.44 In July
34. Final Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on the Central
African Republic, Dec. 22, 2014, U.N. Doc. S/2014/928; Arieff supra note 25, at
1.
35. Zifcak, supra note 26, at 62.
36. Id. at 53.
37. See Human Rights Council, Situation of Human Rights in the Central
African Republic: Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights, Agenda Items 2 and 10, U.N. Doc A/HRC/24/59 (Sept. 12, 2013).
38. S.C. Res. 2127, ¶¶ 28, 50 (Dec. 5, 2013).
39. Id. at ¶ 50.
40. U.N. Secretary General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation
in the Central African Republic, ¶ 57, U.N. Doc. S/2013/787 (Dec. 31, 2013);
Zifcak, supra note 26, at 63N64.
41. Zifcak, supra note 26, at 65.
42. Id. at 64.
43. S.C. Res. 2149 (Apr. 10, 2014).
44. Id. at ¶ 18; see also U.N. SCOR, 69th sess., 7153rd mtg., U.N. Doc
S/PV.7153 (Apr. 10, 2014).
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2016, the mission was reauthorized with Resolution 2301, due to
the ongoing violence and instability in the country.45
C. The Humanitarian Toll: Vulnerability and Exploitation by
Peacekeepers
The civil war has sent CAR into turmoil.46 Even with the de-
ployment of 10,000 military personnel in September 2014, seri-
ous human rights violations, such as rape, murder, forced labor,
and torture persist throughout the country. As a result, CAR re-
mains politically, economically, and socially unstable.47As of Au-
gust 2016, three and a half years after the start of the conflict in
CAR, nearly 421,000 Central Africans remain internally dis-
placed, over 470,000 have fled to neighboring countries,48 and
2.5 million are in need of humanitarian assistance.49
The lack of socioeconomic opportunity and political stability
has heightened the vulnerability of all Central Africans, espe-
cially women and children.50 In the first ten months of 2015,
more than 60,000 accounts of sexual and gender-based violence
were reported to various international organizations, victimiz-
ing over 30,000 Central Africans.51 It is estimated that nearly 44
*e'Qent oM CA9’s MemaHe *o*&Hation Ja%e leen %iQtims oM sei
crimes, such as rape, forced marriage, trafficking, and genital
mutilation.52 While the majority of these victims were violated
by members of rebel groups, relatives, or other members in their
community, there have been at least 108 victims—the majority
45. See SC Res 2301, (July 26, 2016).
46. Nathalie Baptiste, The Central African Republic’s Forgotten Crisis,
NATION (Sept. 11, 2014), https://www.thenation.com/article/central-african-re-
publics-forgotten-crisis/.
47. October 2016 Monthly Forecast: Central African Republic, SEC. COUNCIL
REP. (Sept. 20, 2016), http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-fore-
cast/2016-10/central_african_republic_17.php (last visited Jan. 7, 2018).
48. What’s Driving the Global Refugee Crisis?, INT’LCRISISGROUP (Sept. 15,
2016), https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/what-s-driving-global-refugee-crisis
(last visited Jan. 7, 2018).
49. Humanitarian Bulletin: Central African Republic, Situation Report No.
39, U.N. OFF. COORDINATIONHUMANITARIANAFF. 1 (Aug. 20, 2014), [insert link
here].
50. Dalia Al Achi & Leo Dobbs, Human Rights Day: Abuses Rife in Central
African Republic, UNHCR (Dec. 10, 2015), http://www.unhcr.org/en-
us/news/latest/2015/12/5669a3a66/human-rights-day-abuses-rife-central-afri-
can-republic.html.
51. Id.
52. Zifcak, supra note 26, at 65.
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of whom are children—who have come forward alleging sexual
assault perpetrated by U.N. peacekeepers from the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Republic of Congo, Morocco, France,
Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and Burundi.53
Women’s anO QJiHO'en’s loOies in tJe CA9 QonMHiQt Ja%e leen
used in exchange for vital resources, such as food, water, and
currency.54 Four girls have alleged that they were forced by a
French military commander to have sex with a dog in exchange
for nine dollars.55 Dozens of others have alleged forced sexual
activity in exchange for food andmoney by French, Chadian, and
Equatorial Guinean forces.56
Other children have been violated simply because they were in
the wrong place at the wrong time. As one fourteen-year-old girl
recalls, as she was walking home one day:
The [peacekeepers] were dressed in their military uniforms
and had their guns. I walked by and suddenly one of them
grabbed me by my arms and the other one ripped off my
53. TomMurphy, The U.N. Cannot Stop its Peacekeepers From Raping Chil-
dren in the Central African Republic, HUMANOSPHERE, http://www.humano-
sphere.org/world-politics/2016/04/u-n-cannot-stop-peacekeepers-raping-chil-
dren-central-african-republic/; ‘Sickening’ Sex Abuse Alleged in CAR by U.N.
Peacekeepers, AL-JAZEERA (Mar. 31, 2016),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/03/sex-abuse-alleged-car-peacekeepers-
160331183645566.html; Hisham Aidi, The Sex-for-Food Scandal in Central Af-
rican Republic, AL-JAZEERA (May 7, 2015), http://www.aljazeera.com/in-
depth/opinion/2015/05/sex-food-scandal-central-african-republic-
150505071049079.html.
54. This Note will not draw a strong distinction between direct, physical
sexual violence (i.e. rape) and transactional sex (i.e. prostitution). Peacekeep-
ers are often coming from a position of power, having access to resources that
the local populations in which they come into contact with do not. The 3choice’
to sell one’s body, especially in conflict zones, is often a choice made in the
absence of other viable options for survival. The coercive nature of these trans-
actions, strictly within the context of war, conflict, and peacekeeping, cannot
be seen as a meaningful one. Furthermore, transactional and/or survival sex
can never be seen as consensual when a child is involved. See ELEMENTS OF
CRIMES, INT’L CRIM. CT. 8 (2011), https://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/336923D8-A6AD-40EC-AD7B-
45BF9DE73D56/0/ElementsOfCrimesEng.pdf (discussing elements of the
crimes against humanity within the context of rape, prostitution, and sexual
violence, stating that 7it is understood that a person may be incapable of giving
genuine consent if affected by natural, induced or age-related incapacity.5) (em-
phasis added).
55. Oakford, supra note 4.
56. Aidi, supra note 53.
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clothes. They pulled me into the tall grass and one held my
arms while the other one pinned down my legs and raped me.
The soldier holding my arms tried to hold my mouth, but I was
still able to scream. Because of that, they had to run away be-
fore the second soldier could rape me.57
Other victims also allege being gang-raped by Congolese forces
at a base near the Bambari airport.58
Young boys have also been targets of sexual exploitation and
abuse.59 Between December 2012 and June 2013, there were re-
ports of orphan boys in a camp for internally displaced persons
being raped and sodomized by French peacekeepers.60 Unfortu-
nately, these abuses are notoriously underreported amongst the
male population, especially in areas devastated by conflict.61
57. 7Central African Republic: Rape by Peacekeepers,5 HUM. RTS. WATCH
(Feb. 4, 2016), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/02/04/central-african-republic-
rape-peacekeepers.
58. Id. at 2.
59. See id.; see also Sandra Laville, UN Aid Worker Suspended for Leaking
Report on Child Abuse by French Troops,5 GUARDIAN (Apr. 29, 2015),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/29/un-aid-worker-suspended-
leaking-report-child-abuse-french-troops-car.
60. See Laville, supra note 59.
61. SeeMuna Ndulo, The United Nations Responses to the Sexual Abuse and
Exploitation of Women and Girls by Peacekeepers During Peacekeeping Mis-
sions, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’LL. 127, 143 (2009) (7Given the widely acknowledged
fact that sexual abuse is often not reported by victims who feel powerless and
are frightened and intimidated at the prospect of being confronted by investi-
gators, the figures could very well be an under-reporting of the problem.5); see
also CORINA CSÁKY, NO ONE TO TURN TO: THE UNDER-REPORTING OF CHILD
SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND ABUSE BY AID WORKERS AND PEACEKEEPERS, SAVE
THECHILDREN (2008), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/483c2a822.html.
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II. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL LANDSCAPE
History is fraught with the subjugation of women.62 Women’s
vulnerabilities are exacerbated in times of conflict,63 where their
bodies are viewed as both spoils and tools of war.64 While the
international community has made progress towards protecting
civilians in conflict, especially women and children, it has yet to
be successful in totally eradicating sexual and gender-based vi-
olence during conflict.65 Admittedly, the international commu-
nity has yet to eradicate sexual and gender-based violence in
times of peace as well. As a model for the rest of the world, one
would expect the United Nations to lead by example and comply
with all international human rights laws. Instead, the United
Nations and troop contributing countries have allowed its peace-
keeping forces to continue sexually exploiting and abusing local
populations with impunity,66 thereby directly violating interna-
tional laws regarding sexual exploitation and abuse.67
6Jis :a't jiHH int'oO&Qe tJe inte'nationaH Qomm&nith’s Oe`
HaheO 'eQoLnition oM jomen’s 'iLJts anO Oiscuss the eventual re-
sponse to violence against women in conflict situations. It will
also demonstrate how the international legal landscape, which
62. See Patricia A. Broussard, Repair Versus Rejuvenation: The Condition
of Vaginas as Proxy for the Societal Status of Women, 9 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST.
935, 944 (2011); Kelly D. Askin, Prosecuting Wartime Rape and Other Gender-
Related Crimes Under International Law: Extraordinary Advances, Enduring
Obstacles, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 288, 297 (2003); Sarah T. Deuitch, Putting
the Spotlight on “The Terminator”: How the ICC Prosecution of Bosco Ntaganda
Could Reduce Sexual Violence During Conflict, 22 WM. &MARY J.WOMEN&L.
655, 657 (2016).
63. See Addressing Sexual and Gender-Based Violence, U.N. DEV.
PROGRAMME (2017), http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ourwork/dem-
ocratic-governance-and-peacebuilding/rule-of-law—justice-and-security/sex-
ual-and-gender-based-violence/ (7During violent conflict, rape is often used as
a military tactic to harm, humiliate and shame.5).
64. See Cassandra Clifford, Rape as a Weapon of War and its Long-term Ef-
fects on Victims and Society, 7th Global Conference Violence and the Contexts
of Hostility (May 2008), http://icsforum.org/mediarchive/wp-content/up-
loads/sites/6/2012/04/BMJCliffordPaper.pdf.
65. See Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV)—SGBV Framework,
U.N. OFF. FOR COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFF., http://www.uno-
cha.org/what-we-do/advocacy/thematic-campaigns/sgbv/sgbv-framework (last
visited Jan. 8, 2018) (listing ongoing reports of sexual violence against women
in conflict situations).
66. See Lewis, supra note 12, at 597.
67. Goldberg, supra note 12; Dennenbaum, supra note 12, at 127N28.
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insulates peacekeeping forces from being held accountable, runs
counter to international laws, treaties, and cases actively
fighting violence against women and children in conflict situa-
tions.
A. International Law and Violence Against Women in Conflict
Situations
It was not until the late twentieth and early twenty-first cen-
turies that violence against women became a prosecutable
crime.68 Despite its continued existence,69 rape is so universally
prohibited by States that it is now nearly considered jus cogens,70
otherwise known as a peremptory norm. Most significant to the
field of international law was the recognition and prosecution of
rape and other forms of sexual violence as international wrong-
ful acts.71 Both the International Criminal Tribunal for the for-
mer Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda found that sexual violence could constitute genocide,
crimes against humanity, torture, enslavement, and war
crimes.72
68. U.N. Secretary-General, In-Depth Study on All Forms of Violence
Against Women, at 13, U.N. Doc. A/61/122/Add.1 (July 6, 2006).
69. Facts and Figures: Ending Violence Against Women, UN WOMEN,
http://www.unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/ending-violence-against-
women/facts-and-figures (last visited Feb. 20, 2018) (reporting that one in
three women in her lifetime will experience sexual assault).
70. David S. Mitchell, The Prohibition of Rape in International Humanitar-
ian Law As A Norm of Jus Cogens: Clarifying the Doctrine, 15 DUKE J. COMP.
& INT’L L. 219, 232 (2005) (finding that, 7[i]n order to become jus cogens, there
must be a general norm of international law that is recognized and accepted
by the international community of states as a whole. As articulated in Article
38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), an international
rule must satisfy the three basic sources of international law: treaty, custom,
and general principles of law.5); Askin, supra note 62, at 242 (noting that
7[i]nternational treaties, documents, and U.N. resolutions serve as an indica-
tion of the direction international law is heading regarding fundamental norms
of international law. The greatly increased activity in international law in the
1990s towards affording greater protection, status, and equality to women ev-
idences a universal trend toward jus cogens status for gender-based abuses,
particularly violence.5).
71. Ndulo, supra note 61, at 131.
72. Id.; Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-32-A, Judgment (Feb. 20,
2001) (finding that sexual humiliation constituted a war crime and was a
3grave breach’ of the Geneva Conventions); Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No.
ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment (Sept. 2, 1998) (finding that rape could constitute gen-
ocide); Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Sentencing Judgment (July 14,
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The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC)
OeMines 7Q'imes aLainst J&manith5 to inQH&Oe aQts oM 7'a*eb sei`
ual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced
sterilization, and any other form of sexual violence of compara-
lHe L'a%ith as Q'imes aLainst J&manith^573 Recently, Jean Pierre
Bemba, former Vice President of the Democratic Republic of
Congo, was prosecuted for his crimes against humanity and war
crimes, including crimes of rape and sexual violence in CAR.74
The former Vice President was convicted of crimes committed
against Central Africans from 2002 to 2003 by his rebel faction,
the Movement for Liberation of Congo.75 This was the first time
in ICC history that an individual was prosecuted for crimes of
sexual violence.76
In addition, Common Article III of the Geneva Conventions
lays out minimal protection requirements for internal armed
conflicts.77 Article III provides that all parties to the conflict are
'e(&i'eO to t'eat Qi%iHian nonQomlatants 7J&maneHhb jitJo&t
any adverse distinction founded on race, color, religion or faith,
sex, birth or wealtJb o' anh otJe' simiHa' Q'ite'iab578 including
7%ioHenQe to HiMe anO *e'son5 anO 7o&t'aLes &*on *e'sonaH OiL`
nithb in *a'tiQ&Ha' J&miHiatinL anO OeL'aOinL t'eatmentb579
1997) (recognizing formally that sexual violence is a crime in international
law); Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1, Judgment, ¶ 171 (Dec. 10,
1998) (holding that rape constitutes torture and can be a war crime).
73. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 7 (1)(g), July 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3.
74. Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08
(Mar. 21, 2016).
75. Id. at 171N72.
76. Id. at 52 (charging rape as a crime against humanity and a war crime).
77. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31
[hereinafter Geneva I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condi-
tion of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug.
12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva II]; Geneva Convention Relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [herein-
after Geneva III]; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva IV].
78. Common Article III is contained in all four Geneva Conventions. See
sources cited supra note 77.
79. Id.
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which can include rape and sexual violence.80 Because the Ge-
neva Conventions only apply to States Parties, the United Na-
tions adopted rules and guidelines that mirror the minimum
standards outlined in the Geneva Conventions.81 DPKO, there-
fore, is effectively governed by the Geneva Conventions, to the
extent that the United Nations has incorporated them into its
own rules and guidelines.82
In addition, there are many other firm commitments from the
international community to safeguard the rights of women and
children, such as the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)83 and the Convention
on the Rights of the Child (CRC).84 CEDAW obligates States to
create and enforce laws that protect violence against women.85
8imiHa'Hhb tJe C9C 'e(&i'es 8tates :a'ties to 7&nOe'take aHH a*`
propriate legislative, administrative, and other measures for the
im*Hementation oM tJe 'iLJts 'eQoLnigeO in tJe ^ ^ ^ Con%ention^586
There is no doubt that legal systems across the globe have re-
sponded to the sexual violations perpetrated against women and
girls, in times of peace and conflict.87 From international recog-
nition88 to nationaH HeLisHati%e inQo'*o'ationb jomen’s 'iLJts a'e
finally human rights—at least on paper.89 Despite these efforts
80. Rule 93: Rape and Other forms of Sexual Violence, INT’LCOMMITTEERED
CROSS, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-
ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule93#Fn_56_2 (last visited Jan. 8, 2018).
81. See U.N. Secretariat, Secretary-General’s Bulletin: Observance by
United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law, U.N. Doc.
ST/SGB/1999/13 (Aug. 6, 1999).
82. Ndulo, supra note 61, at, 138.
83. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter CEDAW].
84. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter CRC].
85. CEDAW, supra note 83, art. 2.
86. CRC, supra note 84, art. 4.
87. It must be noted that men and boys are also severely affected by sexual
violence. Women and girls, however, constitute the vast majority of victims in
CAR and worldwide. See U.N. Secretary-General, Conflict-Related Sexual Vio-
lence: Report of the Secretary-General, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. A/66/657-S/2012/33 (Jan.
13, 2012); Margot Wallström, Introduction: Making the Link Between Transi-
tional Justice and Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, 19 WM. &MARY J.WOMEN
&L. 1 (2012). Men and boys deserve particular attention for their own unique
vulnerabilities and particular barriers to justice, which is a topic beyond the
scope of this Note.
88. CEDAW, supra note 83.
89. Wallström, supra note 87.
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to mainst'eamjomen’s 'iLJtsb90 rape and sexual assault remain
the most underreported and pervasive crimes in the world,91
where one in three women are likely to be sexually assaulted in
their lifetime.92 There has been a plethora of research conducted
on the barriers victims face in accessing the criminal justice sys-
tem in times of war and conflict, including sociocultural norms
and inaccessible complaint mechanisms (i.e. law enforcement,
courts).93 It must be noted, however, that Central African women
and girls, who have been exploited by U.N. peacekeepers, en-
counter additional barriers to receiving justice, namely the im-
munity and protections of the United Nations and DPKO, as well
as the protections afforded to peacekeepers in the name of na-
tional sovereignty.94
B. The DPKO
Despite compelling evidence of ongoing sexual exploitation
and abuse perpetrated by U.N. peacekeepers in CAR, the United
Nations has not been able to hold these troops accountable for
their actions.95 Unfortunately, this is not a problem unique to
CAR. Sexual exploitation and abuse has been a longstanding
problem for U.N. peacekeeping missions.96 Peacekeepers go
90. See, e.g., CEDAW, supra note 83.
91. Meetings Coverage, Security Council, Sexual Violence in Conflict One of
World’s Most Vicious Crimes: Global Community Must Use All Its Tools to End
It, Says Secretary-General in Security Council, U.N. Meetings Coverage
SC/10977 (Apr. 17, 2013).
92. Facts and Figures: Ending Violence Against Women, supra note 69.
93. See Hilmi M. Zawati, The Challenge of Prosecuting Conflict-Related
Gender-Based Crimes Under Libyan Transitional Justice, 10 J. INT’LL.& INT’L
REL. 44, 46 (2014) (citing to structural failings in the Libyan legal system that
failed to protect women, amongst other sociological and cultural barriers, such
as piety, shame, stigma, and self-blame); Wallström, supra note 87, at 2 (noting
that 7sexual violence remains an afterthought in many transitional justice pro-
cesses5); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, OLD CRIMES, SAME SUFFERING: NO JUSTICE
FOR SURVIVORS OF WARTIME RAPE IN NORTH-EAST BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
(2012), http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/as-
set/EUR63/002/2012/en/f688b1c8-1fa2-46ba-ae26-
0b6ec344401f/eur630022012en.pdf (citing State inaction and lack of political
will as barriers to justice).
94. Lewis, supra note 12, at 597.
95. Goldberg, supra note 12; Dennenbaum, supra note 12, at 127N28.
96. See generally, Ndulo, supra note 61, at, 143; Csáky, supra note 61;
UNHCR and Save the Children-UK, Note for Implementing and Operational
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largely unpunished, due to the lack of U.N. authority over the
prosecution of such cases, as well as the lack of an international
instrument demanding that troop contributing countries hold
their soldiers responsible for such crimes.97 As Muna Ndulo, pro-
Messo' anO sQJoHa' oM inte'nationaH Hajb *oints o&tb 7otnJe MaQt
that sexual violence, exploitation, and abuse occur on a compar-
atively widespread basis in conflict areas indicates that the
peacekeepers committing these acts either do not view the acts
they engage in as wrong or that they fear no serious negative
'e*e'Q&ssions Mo' tJei' aQtions^598
1. The United Nations has no Authority to Enforce its Codes of
Conduct
In response to sexual abuse allegations made against U.N.
peacekeepers during the Bosnian War in the 1990s and peace-
keeping missions in West Africa in 2003,99 then-U.N. Secretary-
General, Kofi Annan, created explicit prohibitions against sex-
ual exploitation and abuse.100 The Secretary-General defined
3sei&aH ei*Hoitation’ as 7anh actual or attempted abuse of a posi-
tion of vulnerability, differential power, or trust, for sexual pur-
poses, including, but not limited to profiting monetarily, socially
o' *oHitiQaHHh M'om tJe sei&aH oM anotJe'^5101 He has explicitly de-
MineO 3sei&aH al&se’ as tJe 7aQt&aH o' tJ'eateneO *JhsiQaH int'&`
sion of a sexual nature, whether by force or under unequal or
Qoe'Qi%e QonOitions^5102
Partners on Sexual Violence & Exploitation: The Experience of Refugee Chil-
dren in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone (Feb. 2002); U.N. Secretary-General,
Special Measures for Protection From Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse,
U.N. Doc A/58/559 (Nov. 10, 2003); Paul Higate,Gender and Peacekeeping Case
Studies: The Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sierra Leone, (Institute for
Security Studies No. 91, Jan. 2003), https://www.africaportal.org/docu-
ments/4266/Mono91.pdf.
97. Lewis, supra note 12, at 597. See also Goldberg, supra note 12; Dennen-
baum, supra note 12, at 127N28.
98. Ndulo, supra note 61, at 144.
99. See G.A. Res. 57/306, Investigation into Sexual Exploitation of Refugees
by Aid Workers in West Africa (May 22, 2003).
100. U.N. Secretary-General, Secretary-General’s Bulletin on Special
Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse, § 2.2,
U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/2003/13 (Oct. 9, 2003).
101. Id. § 1.
102. Id.
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Moreover, the United Nations has produced codes of conduct
for its peacekeeping personnel in two publications: Ten Rules:
Code of Conduct for Blue Helmets103 and We Are United Nations
Peacekeepers.104 Specifically, Rule Four in the Ten Rules pro-
%iOes tJat *eaQekee*e's jiHH 7not inO&HLe in immo'aH aQts oM sei`
ual, physical, or psychological abuse or exploitation of the local
population or United Nations staff, especially women and chil-
O'en^5105 We Are United Nations Peacekeepers contains a near
identical corollary in its articles.106 These rules, however, often
fall on deaf ears. Because the United Nations does not have its
own standing army, it relies solely on its Member States to con-
tribute military personnel to its peacekeeping operations.107 The
rules contained in the Ten Rules and We Are United Nations
Peacekeepers, therefore, are considered mere guidelines and are
non-binding.108
It is the troop contributing countries, not the United Nations
o' r:U;b tJat 'etain 7eiQH&si%e I&'isOiQtion to *'oseQ&te and
otJe'jise OisQi*Hine its miHita'h *e'sonneH^5109 These jurisdic-
tional agreements are contained within the SOFAs110 and
MOUs111 of each peacekeeping mission. The United Nations uti-
lized the model SOFA for MINUSCA.112 The agreements signed
between the troop contributing countries andMINUSCA provide
103. See U.N. DEP’T OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, TEN RULES: CODE OF
PERSONAL CONDUCT FOR BLUEHELMETS (1998), https://cdu.unlb.org/UNStand-
ardsofConduct/TenRulesCodeofPersonalConductForBlueHelmets.aspx [here-
inafter TEN RULES].
104. See U.N. DEP’T OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS TRAINING UNIT, WE ARE
UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPERS, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/docu-
ments/un_in.pdf [hereinafter WEAREUNITEDNATIONS PEACEKEEPERS].
105. TEN RULES, supra note 103.
106. WE ARE UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPERS, supra note 104, at 3 (7[U.N.
peacekeepers will not] commit any act that could result in physical, sexual, or
psychological abuse of the local population, especially women and children.5).
107. Elizabeth F. Defeis, U.N. Peacekeepers and Sexual Abuse and Exploita-
tion: An End to Impunity, 7 WASH. U.GLOBALSTUD. L. REV. 185, 205N06 (2008).
108. Press Release, Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, Special
Committee on Peacekeeping Operations Begins Review of Report on Sexual
Exploitation: Stressing Urgency, Determination to Address Problem, Depart-
ment Head Outlines Measures Taken So Far, U.N. Doc GA/PK/186 (Apr. 4,
2005).
109. Defeis, supra note 107, at 206.
110. Model SOFA, supra note 14, ¶¶ 15, 24N31, 46N49 (discussing jurisdic-
tion).
111. Revised Model MoU, supra note 14.
112. S.C. Res. 2149, ¶ 41 (Apr. 10, 2014).
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that each State is responsible for holding its soldiers accountable
for sexual violations.113 While the United Nations has not been
given the authority to independently prosecute these crimes, it
does retain the ability to send troops home.114
2. 6Je 4^R^’s 9es*onse to CA9b tJe 8ei&aH [i*Hoitation anO
Abuse Policies, and Failure to Protect
Although the United Nations does not have jurisdiction to
prosecute or otherwise punish U.N. peacekeeper misconduct, its
initial response to the allegations of sexual exploitation and
abuse perpetrated by its peacekeepers in CAR was wholly inef-
fective and counter to its mandate, rules, and regulations. Ac-
cording to an independent review led by Marie Deschamps:
The manner in which U.N. agencies responded to the Allega-
tions was seriously flawed. The head of the U.N. mission in
CAR failed to take any action to follow up on the Allegations;
he neither asked the Sangaris Forces to institute measures to
end the abuses, nor directed that the children be removed to
safe housing. He also failed to direct his staff to report the Al-
legations higher up within the UN. . . . Instead, information
about the Allegations was passed from desk to desk, inbox to
inbox, across multiple U.N. offices, with no one willing to take
responsibility to address the serious human rights violations. .
. . Overall, the response of the U.N. was fragmented and bu-
'ea&Q'atiQb anO MaiHeO to satisMh tJe 4R’s Qo'e manOate to aO`
dress human rights violations.115
The United Nations has two policy frameworks which, accord-
ing to the independent review, were not applied to the allega-
tions of sexual violence in CAR.116 The first is a collection of pol-
icies focused on responding to sexual exploitation and abuse by
U.N. troops under its command, known as the SEA Policies.117
113. Central African Republic: Rape by Peacekeepers, supra note 57, at 2.
114. Id.
115. Deschamps, supra note 4, at i.
116. Id. at iiNiii.
117. Id. at iiNiii (explaining that SEA polices outline the appropriate re-
sponses to sexual exploitation and abuse committed 7by UN staff and related
personnel, including troops under UN command. They do not apply to troops
not under UN Command. The Sangaris Forces, for example, are not covered by
the SEA Policies.5)
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These policies do not give the United Nations authority to pun-
ish a perpetrator.118 Rather, the United Nations is required to
investigate and then defer to the authority of the troop contrib-
uting country to handle the situation.119 Unfortunately, this pol-
iQh Jas 'es&HteO in tJe t'oo* Qont'il&tinL Qo&nt'ies’ MaiH&'e to
prosecute perpetrators, thereby allowing the sexual exploitation
by peacekeepers to continue with impunity.120 Moreover, the in-
dependent review found that when acts of sexual violence were
committed by peacekeepers, U.N. staff did not believe that the
J&man 'iLJts M'amejo'k a**HieOb anO M&'tJe'b jJe'e 7an aHHe`
gation that a peacekeeper not operating under UN command has
sexually assaulted a civilian (and the SEA Policies do not apply),
some UN staff [took] the view that the UN has no obligation, or
inOeeO a&tJo'ithb to aOO'ess tJe 'e*o'teO sei&aH %ioHenQe^5121
The second framework comes from the U.N. Charter, which fo-
cuses on the promotion and protection of human rights, as well
as the duty of the United Nations to respond to allegations of
human rights violations.122 Ideally, a response to allegations
would include an investigation, reporting, protection and ser-
vices, and the promotion of accountability to hold perpetrators
responsible for their actions.123 The U.N. failed to operationalize
a coordinated response and protect these victims of sexual vio-
lence because it did not want to hold itself accountable for its
*eaQekee*inL Mo'Qes’ aQtions^ WJiHe tJe 4niteO Rations Jas 'e`
cently acknowledged the allegations briefly in its reauthoriza-
tion of MINUSCA in Resolution 2301,124 it has been ineffective
118. Id. at iii.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 3 (declaring that 7[t]he Purposes of the United
Nations are [t]o achieve international co-operation in solving international
problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in
promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental free-
doms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.5).
123. Deschamps, supra note 4, at iii.
124. Resolution 2301 briefly addresses the allegations of sexual exploitation
lh ei*'essinL QonQe'n o%e' tJese aHHeLations anO 7st'essinL tJe &'Lent neeO Mo'
Troop- and Police-contributing countries . . . to promptly investigate those al-
legations . . . and for those responsible for such criminal offenses or misconduct
to le JeHO to aQQo&nt^5 S.C. Res. 2301, at 2 (July 26, 2016).
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in protecting victims of sexual violence perpetrated by U.N.
peacekeepers and vindicating the rights of those victims.125
3. Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations
The privileges and immunities of the United Nations were first
announced in Article 105, paragraph 1, of the U.N. Charter , de-
QHa'inL Mo' itseHM tJat 7otnJe ;'Lanigation sJaHH enIoh in tJe te'`
ritory of each of its Members such privileges and immunities as
a'e neQessa'h Mo' tJe M&HMiHHment oM its *&'*oses^5126 The Charter
M&'tJe' OeQHa'eO in A'tiQHe G\Ab *a'aL'a*J Eb tJat 7'e*'esenta`
tives of the Members of the United Nations and officials of the
Organization shall similarly enjoy such privileges and immuni-
ties as are necessary for the independent exercise of their func-
tions in QonneQtion jitJ tJe ;'Lanigation^5127 Immediately fol-
lowing the adoption of the Charter, the United Nations adopted
the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United
Nations,128 M&'tJe' OesQ'ilinL tJe ;'Lanigation’s imm&nith
'iLJts anO OeQHa'inL tJat 7otnJe4niteO Rationsb its *'o*e'th anO
assets wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy im-
munity from every form of legal process, except insofar as in any
*a'tiQ&Ha' Qase it Jas ei*'essHh jai%eO its imm&nith^5129 In ef-
fect, this means that unless the Secretary-General waives im-
munity, U.N. personnel cannot be prosecuted for acts performed
in the course of their U.N. duties.130
During the investigation of the allegations made against the
French Sangaris forces by the French government, the United
Nations, citing its immunity, refused to allow a human rights
officer, who possessed pertinent information regarding the al-
leged misconduct, to cooperate in the investigation.131 In effect,
the United Nations halted an investigation of human rights
abuses. After a year of back and forth between the United Na-
tions and French officials, the Secretary-General finally waived
125. Patrick J. Lewis, Who Pays for the United Nations’ Torts?: Immunity,
Attribution, and ‘Appropriate Modes of Settlement’, 39 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM.
259, 261 (2014).
126. U.N. Charter art. 105, ¶ 1.
127. Id. ¶ 2.
128. See Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations,
Feb. 13, 1946, 1 U.N.T.S. 15.
129. Id. art. 2, § 2.
130. Id.
131. Deschamps, supra note 4, at vi.
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the immunity of the human rights officer.132 The independent
review of the handling of the allegations in CAR found that this
approach was unnecessary, stating that the United Nations
sJo&HO OeQHa'e imm&nith onHh jJe'e it Jas Oete'mineO tJat 7Ois`
closure of information . . . could result in a security threat to the
victims or witnesses, or where the victim did not provide his or
Je' inMo'meO Qonsent to tJe OisQHos&'e oM tJe inMo'mation^5133
4. State Sovereignty and Failure to Prosecute Peacekeepers
States have long enjoyed sovereign immunity.134 The advent of
international law and the United Nations, however, has begun
to alter what it means to be sovereign in a globalized, communi-
tarian world.135 Indeed, the proliferation of human rights com-
mitments has dramatically reshaped the ways in which States
conduct themselves, both inter- and intra-nationally. Among
these commitments is the responsibility of the State to not vio-
late the rights of others and the obligation to protect, promote,
and fulfill human rights.136
132. Id.
133. Id. at xii.
134. Lewis, supra note 125, at 260; ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND
PROCESSES: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE USE IT 81 (1994); Jurisdictional
Immunities of the State (Ger. v. Italy), 2012 I.C.J. 99 (Feb. 3); The Case of the
S.S. Lotus, 1927 PCIJ Series A, No. 10 (finding that whatever is not explicitly
prohibited by international law is permitted).
135. See generally THEODOR MERON, THE HUMANIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2006) (examining the effects of humanitarian law and human rights law
on international law). See alsoU.N. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, Empow-
ering the United Nations, 71 FOREIGNAFF. 89, 98N99 (Winter 1992N93) (7While
respect for the fundamental sovereignty and integrity of the state remains cen-
tral, it is undeniable that the centuries-old doctrine of absolute and exclusive
sovereignty no longer stands, and was in fact never so absolute as it was con-
ceived to be in theory.5).
136. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, together with the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its two Optional Protocols,
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, form
the International Bill of Human Rights. Fact Sheet No. 2 (Rev. 1), The Interna-
tional Bill of Human Rights, OHCHR 1, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Pub-
lications/FactSheet2Rev.1en.pdf. By becoming parties to the aforementioned
Covenants and Declaration, as well as other international human rights trea-
ties, States assume obligations and duties under international law to respect,
protect, and fulfill human rights. Id. at 4.
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Within the context of sexual exploitation and abuse, failure to
act with due diligence is a violation of these obligations.137 States
have an explicit obligation to prevent sexual violence, investi-
gate occurrences of sexual violence, prosecute offenders, and pro-
vide protection to the victims of such atrocities.138 Therefore, de-
spite the UniteO Rations’ egregious mishandling of the allega-
tions of sexual exploitation and abuse, the ultimate responsibil-
ity to prosecute peacekeepers for their sexual misconduct lies
with troop contributing countries.139
As per the SOFAs and MOUs in MINUSCA, the troop-contrib-
uting countries retain full jurisdiction to prosecute and disci-
pline their troops for misconduct.140 As of 2017, however, only
three peacekeepers have been prosecuted for their alleged sexual
exploitation and abuse.141 The failure to adhere to its interna-
tional obligations of prevention, punishment, and compensation
to victims ought to be treated as a breach of state responsibility.
III. THEORIZING ANEWWAY FORWARD: INVOKING STATE
RESPONSIBILITY TO ENSURE PEACEKEEPING ACCOUNTABILITY
While the United Nations is certainly to blame for its institu-
tional failings in handling the allegations of sexual exploitation
and abuse in CAR, ultimate responsibility lies with the States to
137. Hum. Rts. Council Resolution, e.g. 14/12 (2010) (stressing that States
have the obligation to prevent, investigate, prosecute, and punish the
perpetrators of violence against women and girls and provide protection
to the victims, and that failure to do so violates their human rights and
fundamental freedoms); G.A. Res. 67/144 (Feb. 27, 2013) (finding that States
have the obligation to promote and protect human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all, and must exercise due diligence to prevent, investigate,
prosecute, and punish the perpetrators of violence against women and
girls and eliminate impunity); Declaration on the Elimination of Violence
Against Women, supra note 17, at art. 4(c), (referring to the due diligence ob-
ligation to prevent, investigate, punish, and provide compensation for acts of
violence against women, whether those acts are perpetrated by the State or by
private persons).
138. Id.
139. Id.; see also, Model SOFA, supra note 14; Revised Model MoU, supra
note 14.
140. Model SOFA, supra note 14.
141. As of 2017, the prosecution of three peacekeepers is ongoing in the Dem-
ocratic Republic of Congo. UN Peacekeepers Go on Trial for CAR Sex Abuse,
ALJAZEERA (Apr. 5, 2016),
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/04/peacekeepers-trial-sex-abuse-car-
160405040318812.html.
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prosecute their troops. This Part will propose the invocation of
state responsibility for troop contributing countries that fail to
investigate and prosecute their peacekeepers for sexual viola-
tions.
A. Establishing the Attribution of Troop Contributing Countries
The laws of state responsibility, as articulated in the Interna-
tionaH Taj Commission’s 9es*onsiliHith oM 8tates Mo' Wnte'na`
tionally Wrongful Acts (also known as the Articles on State Re-
sponsibility, or ARSIWA), are the principles governing when an
international obligation has been breached, whether that breach
is attributable to the State, and the legal consequences of that
violation (cessation and/or reparations).142 While ARSIWA does
not put forth any primary or substantive rules, it does articulate
when State actions are in violation of the primary rules.143
1. The Actual Acts of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by Peace-
keepers are Not Attributable to the Troop Contributing
Countries
Conduct is attributable to a State when a state organ acts
within144 or beyond its capacity,145 or when a private individual
aQts jitJ tJe 8tate’s enOo'sement^146 Within the context of the
MINUSCA peacekeeping mission, the sexual exploitation and
abuse allegedly perpetrated by peacekeepers are not attributa-
ble per se to troop contributing countries because the peacekeep-
ers were acting under the command and control of MINUSCA.147
As explained, however, the United Nations is constrained by
142. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on theWork of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc.
A/56/10, at 31 (2001) [hereinafter DRAFT ARTICLES].
143. Id.
144. Id. at 40.
145. Id. at 43.
146. Id.
147. The actions of Sangaris forces before the establishment of MINUSCA
under Resolution 2149, however, may be directly attributable to France. While
their mission was authorized by the Security Council under Resolution 2127,
they remained under the command of French authorities. S.C. Res. 2127 ¶ 50
(Dec. 5, 2013). In this case, the actions of Sangaris forces can be seen as at-
tributable to France under Article 7 of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. DRAFT ARTICLES, supra note 142, at
43.
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MOUs148 and SOFAs149 to punish this misconduct because it has
delegated all jurisdictional authority to prosecute peacekeepers
to the troop contributing countries. Therefore, State responsibil-
ity cannot be invoked for the actions of the troop contributing
Qo&nt'ies’ *eaQekee*ing forces while under MINUSCA com-
mand.
2. Failure to Investigate and Prosecute Peacekeepers is a
Breach of an International Obligation
Although state responsibility cannot be invoked for the actions
oM t'oo* Qont'il&tinL Qo&nt'ies’ *eaQekee*inL Mo'Qes jJile under
MINUSCA command, state responsibility can be invoked for
failure to follow through on international obligations to investi-
gate and prosecute these crimes.150 The jurisdiction of troop con-
tributing countries over peacekeeping forces is explicit in the
MOUs151 and SOFAs.152 Article 7 quinquiens of the Revised
Draft Model Memorandum of Understanding provides that:
(1) Military members and any civilian members subject to na-
tional military law of the national contingent provided by the
Government are subject to tJe Yo%e'nment’s eiQH&si%e I&'is`
diction in respect of any crimes or offences that might be com-
mitted by the while they are assigned to the military compo-
nent of [United Nations peacekeeping mission]. The Govern-
ment assures the United Nations that it shall exercise such ju-
risdiction with respect to such crimes or offences.
(2) The Government further assures the United Nations that
it shall exercise such disciplinary jurisdiction as might be nec-
essary with respect to all other acts of misconduct committed
lh anhmemle's oM tJeYo%e'nment’s nationaH QontinLentjJiHe
they are assigned to the military component of [United Nations
peacekeeping mission] that do not amount to crimes or of-
fences.153
Article 47(b) of the Model Status of Forces Agreement states
tJat 7[m]ilitary members of the military component of the U.N.
148. Revised Model MoU, supra note 14.
149. Model SOFA, supra note 14.
150. DRAFT ARTICLES, supra note 142, at 31.
151. Revised Model MoU, supra note 14.
152. Model SOFA, supra note 14.
153. Revised Model MoU, supra note 14, at art. 7.
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peacekeeping operation shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the respective participating States in respect of any crim-
inal offences which may be committed by them in [their host
country/te''ito'hn^5154 SOFAs and MOUs are considered treaties
and have binding authority over States,155 and troop contrib-
uting countries must comply with their terms.156 It is clear that
troop contributing countries have breached their obligations un-
der MOUs157 and SOFAs158 by failing to discipline their peace-
keepers for alleged acts of misconduct.159
Further, the obligation of due diligence applies in the context
of failing to investigate and prosecute peacekeeping forces who
allegedly sexually exploited and abused civilians.160 States are
responsible for the human rights violations they commit.161
Overtime, international law has also required States to pro-
tect,162 promote,163 and fulfill human rights.164 Although the ac-
tions of peacekeepers under MINUSCA control are not attribut-
able to troop contributing countries, the failure to prosecute
154. Model SOFA, supra note 14, art. 47(b).
155. Id. (7The SOFA and MOU are binding documents which establish the
relationship, in the case of the SOFA, between the UN and the host country,
and in the case of the MOU, between the UN and the contributing State.5).
156. Id.
157. Revised Model MoU, supra note 14.
158. Model SOFA, supra note 14 art. 47(b).
159. BRUCE OSWALD, HELEN DURHAM & ADRIAN BATES, DOCUMENTS ON THE
LAWOFUNPEACEOPERATIONS 12 (Oxford University Press, 2010). (7The SOFA
and MOU are binding documents which establish the relationship, in the case
of the SOFA, between the UN and the host country, and in the case of the
MOU, between the UN and the contributing State.5).
160. DRAFTARTICLES, supra note 142, at 34 (7The same is true of other stand-
ards, whether they involve some degree of fault, culpability, negligence or want
of due diligence.5).
161. See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, State Responsibility to Investigate and Prose-
cute Grave Human Rights Violations in International Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 449,
452 (Mar. 1990).
162. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, supra note
17.
163. See Hum. Rts. Council Res. 14/12, U.N. Doc A/HRC/RES/14/12(June 30,
2010) (stressing that States have the obligation to promote and protect all hu-
man rights and fundamental freedoms of women and girls).
164. G.A. Res. 67/144 (Feb. 27, 2013) (finding that States have the obligation
to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all).
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these human rights violations, as per the SOFA andMOU agree-
ments, is a violation of the obligation of due diligence.165 It is the
failure to adhere to the terms in the SOFA and MOU agree-
ments, as well as the failure to act with due diligence, that cause
troop contributing countries to continue committing human
rights abuses with impunity.
B. Finding an Injured or Interested Party: Who Can Invoke
State Responsibility?
Article 33 of the Draft Articles provides:
(1) The obligations of the responsible State set out in this Part
may be owed to another State, to several States, or to the in-
ternational community as a whole, depending in particular on
the character and content of the international obligation and
on the circumstances of the breach.
(2) This Part is without prejudice to any right, arising from the
international responsibility of a State, which may accrue di-
rectly to any person or entity other than a State.166
In other words, States owe other States, or the international
community as a whole, the obligation to not violate their inter-
national obligations. The Draft Articles create the ability for an
injured State to invoke state responsibility, but also provides
that States may bring actions for violations that affect the entire
international community.167
In the instant matter, the slowly reforming CAR government
may seek to invoke state responsibility on behalf of its citizens
165. Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4
(July 29, 1988), at 172 (finding that 7[a]n illegal act, which violates human
rights and which is initially not directly imputable to a State, can lead to in-
ternational responsibility of the State, not because of an act itself, but because
of the lack of due diligence to prevent the violation or to respond to it as re-
quired by the Convention.5).
166. DRAFT ARTICLES, supra note 142, at 94.
167. Id. at 117,126 (providing that an injured State may 7invoke the respon-
sibility of another State if the obligation breached is owed to . . . that State
individually . . . or a group of States including that State, or the international
community as a whole5); see also Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co. (Bel-
gium v. Spain), New Application, 1970 ICJ Rep. 4, 32 (finding that some rights
implicate the entire international community, and that 7[i]n view of the im-
portance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest
in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.5).
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by seeking not only cessation, but also reparations.168 In the al-
ternative, a third-party State may also invoke state responsibil-
ity if they can establish a nexus between the sexual violence
committed in CAR and an erga omnes obligation to the interna-
tional community generally, as well as establish their own legal
interest.169 Individuals cannot invoke state responsibility di-
rectly, but rather need either their government or some other
legally interested party to invoke state responsibility on their
behalf.170
C. Will States Continue to Contribute Troops Under Rigid
Rules?
There always remains the concern that States will not sign
onto an agreement that in some way limits their sovereignty.
Ideally, the inclusion of strict investigation and prosecution re-
quirements into SOFAs and MOUs would balance sovereignty
and enforcement concerns by still allowing States to have control
over the investigation and prosecution of their own forces, while
also allowing for the invocation of state responsibility should
they fail to follow the agreements. If a State refuses to operate
under such terms, the United Nations should cut its losses. The
United Nations should not seek to allow a State to deploy its
troops on U.N. peacekeeping missions if that State cannot prom-
ise to (a) refrain from raping and sexually exploiting local popu-
lations, and/or (b) investigate and prosecute offenders. Ideals,
however, even at the United Nations, can only go so far when
there are scant resources available.
168. DRAFT ARTICLES, supra note 142, at 126 (explaining that injured States
7may claim from the responsible State: (a) cessation of the internationally
wrongful act, and assurances and guarantees of non-repetition . . . and (b) per-
formance of the obligation of reparation . . . in the interest of the injured State
or of the beneficiaries of the obligation breached.5).
169. Belgium v. Spain, supra note 167, at 32 (providing that erga omnes ob-
ligations derive 7from the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide,
[and] also from the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the hu-
man person, including protection from slavery and racial discrimination . . .
others are conferred by international instruments of a universal or quasi-uni-
versal character.5).
170. RODA VERHEYAN, CLIMATE CHANGE DAMAGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW:
PREVENTIONDUTIES AND STATE RESPONSIBILITY 242 (2005).
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CONCLUSION
There have been an exhaustive number of pleas for internal
reform at the United Nations and DPKO. It is time that the two
agencies adequately respond to these allegations of sexual ex-
ploitation and abuse by peacekeepers, invoking their core man-
dates of peace and security. The best way to balance sovereignty
and human rights concerns within the peacekeeping context is
to allow troop contributing countries to retain sole prosecutorial
powers, while also including strict guidelines in SOFAs and
MOUs for States Parties to follow, invoking state responsibility
for any failure to follow through on those commitments. The sex-
ual exploitation and abuse perpetrated by U.N. peacekeepers
undoubtedly undermines the legitimacy of peacekeeping opera-
tions as a whole. By holding governments accountable for the
actions of its troops, the United Nations can work to restore its
reputation as human rights defenders.
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